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David DeGrazia’s Creation Ethics1 is a fas-
cinating effort to present a consistent
account of creation in many contexts—
from reproduction, to self-creation
through genetic enhancement, to the cre-
ation of entire future generations. For
reasons of space, this comment addresses
the related discussions of bearing children
in wrongful life cases (chapter 5) and
bearing children with disadvantages
(chapter 6).
DeGrazia’s views about moral status
ground the volume: (1) our biological
identity (ie, our identity as an organism,
not our narrative identity) begins at a
point reasonably close to fertilisation,
when twinning or merger is no longer
possible; (2) sentience is sufﬁcient for
moral status, but the claim that it is neces-
sary condition is roughly as (in)defensible
as that the potential for sentience is sufﬁ-
cient for moral status; and (3) the capacity
to care about a lost future is relevant to
the harm of death. At the level of political
theory, DeGrazia holds that where there is
reasonable ethical disagreement, the state
should not impose one view on others
and thus neither forbid nor use public
funds to support disputed practices.
About procreative duties, DeGrazia
walks similarly ﬁne liberal lines.
DeGrazia’s views about biological identity
imply that before postconception unique-
ness, there is no individual to be harmed
or wronged. Thus, any individual-affecting
account of the harms or wrongs involved
in procreation must rest in postconception
circumstances. This point explains the
difference between decisions about
whether to start a child (where there is no
‘before’ individual on which to base com-
parisons) and decisions about an entity
that has been started and can be harmed.
Comparative or counterfactual analyses of
harm—that the individual was or would
have been better off in the condition of
non-existence—thus cannot explain wrong
life claims. Instead, an individual-affecting
analysis of why a birth is wrongful might
be that the birth harms the individual
non-comparatively—that the individual’s
existence is simply bad overall and thus the
decision to create the individual is a wrong
to it postexistence. On this analysis, if a
life overall holds more harm than good,
decisions to start that life wrong the indi-
vidual whose life it is. On DeGrazia’s view,
there are a limited set of cases in which a
life overall holds more harm than good,
such as Tay Sachs disease or Lesch Nyhan
syndrome or perhaps a life of inevitable
and miserable slavery. (In chapter 6,
without argument, DeGrazia states, “We
might conﬁdently add to the wrongful life
category cases in which, say, a child will
predictably be blind, deaf, profoundly
retarded, and incapable of reaching adult
age.”) In such circumstances, DeGrazia
concludes, starting the child is a wrong to
the subsequent individual; as the parents’
interests in liberty to procreate are weaker
ethical considerations, parents have a duty
not to procreate in such cases. But these
cases—of a life ﬁlled with harm overall—
are few.
Far more difﬁcult theoretically for
DeGrazia are cases in which much is
harmful in the life of a child, but there are
sufﬁcient beneﬁts to make the life overall
worth living. These cases—DeGrazia
treats cases of severely disadvantaging
social circumstances such as slavery or
extreme poverty, cases of signiﬁcant phys-
ical or mental impairment, and cases of
physical or mental impairments that in the
social circumstances are irremediably
severely disadvantaging as on a par—are
ones not in which an existing individual is
made worse off, but in which either no or
a different individual comes to be. Some
writers have analysed these cases in terms
of asymmetries of harm and beneﬁt,
arguing that it is worse for there to be an
existing individual experiencing harms
than it is for there to be an absence of
beneﬁts because no individual comes to
be. In David Benatar’s view,2 absence of
beneﬁts is different from presence of
harms and decisions about whether an
individual’s life should continue are dif-
ferent from decisions about whether to
start an individual. DeGrazia rejects these
asymmetries as covertly rooted in assump-
tions that compare the situation of the
existing individual to the situation of a
non-existent entity, which is in his view
incoherent. Appeals to impersonal states
of affairs will not help with the
asymmetry because while the absence of
harm is impersonally good the absence of
beneﬁt is impersonally bad construed in
terms of the overall value of states of
affairs. Seana Shiffrin3 4 defends a differ-
ent approach to harm/beneﬁt asymmetry
rooted in the types of harms and their
relation to autonomy; in her view, harms
matter more ethically if they severely
affect an agent’s ability to implement his/
her desires in the world. From Shiffrin’s
view, DeGrazia develops an antiprocrea-
tionist argument based on the premise
that it is morally wrong to impose uncon-
sented harm on an individual to procure
pure beneﬁts for that individual (in con-
trast to avoiding harm to that individual).
DeGrazia rejects this premise as present-
ing at best a defeasible reason against an
action that might be overridden by other
moral values, for it overgeneralises in con-
tending that all procreation causes or
imposes harm. Rather than directly
causing or imposing harm, he contends,
procreation in favourable circumstances
creates the conditions under which an
individual is exposed to harm, and like-
wise to beneﬁts.
But what of cases in which it is known
or highly likely that the harm will exist
from the moment of birth: cases in which
an individual will be born with a signiﬁ-
cant disability or born into a brutal world
and which thus seem far more like impos-
ing unconsented harm to achieve what-
ever beneﬁt will occur in the individual’s
life? DeGrazia sees these cases as very
much like wrongful life cases and con-
cludes that in such cases it is strongly pro
tanto wrong to procreate—because these
are cases of imposing unconsented harm
to procure pure beneﬁt. Three reasons
might still override this pro tanto judg-
ment: parental procreative liberty, beneﬁts
to the individual created and the imper-
sonal value of bringing good into the
world. The strongest of these is that
imposing unconsented harm may some-
times be justiﬁed in pursuit of pure bene-
ﬁts. An example would be bringing a child
into the world with the knowledge that
that child will be blind but in circum-
stances that offer a reasonable prospect of
a good life for the child. But DeGrazia’s
adherence to this view is unstable.
In DeGrazia’s view, many cases in
which an individual’s life will on balance
contain more beneﬁt than harm are cases
of wrongful procreation. Parents owe
their children more: a life with resources
and conditions that contribute to a decent
human life. More speciﬁcally, parents owe
their children at a minimum worthwhile
lives in which basic needs are reasonably
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expected to be met (except when the
expected failure to meet a basic need is
due to external circumstances beyond the
parents’ control such as poverty). This
exception is introduced because DeGrazia
believes it is too great a restriction on par-
ental liberty to hold that it is impermis-
sible for those in precarious circumstances
to reproduce. Basic needs include food
and water, shelter and clothing, needed
medical care, freedom from slavery or
coercion or abuse, education and stimula-
tion, and opportunities to play and
explore one’s own path in the world;
although these might be overridden by
parental liberties in some circumstances,
one ﬁnal basic need is non-negotiable for
DeGrazia: the love, kindness and atten-
tion of at least one committed, reasonably
competent parent. Some prospective
parents are in circumstances in which they
could not have a child without risks to
one or more basic needs, such as serious
poverty without likely prospects of allevi-
ation. Here, although it would be ‘noble’
to forebear parenthood, procreative rights
prevail. Other prospective parents,
however, have the choice of whether to
procreate genetically or to become parents
by gamete donation or adoption; analysis
of such cases, DeGrazia suggests, might
turn on whether freedom from signiﬁcant
and avoidable (by the individual’s non-
existence) disability is also a basic need.
For such cases, DeGrazia turns to a ‘non-
individual affecting’ sense of the parents’
child: the parents could have chosen to
have a child without the disability even
though they could not have had a
particular child without the disability.
Here, DeGrazia adopts a hybrid view that
both person-affecting harm and non-
person-affecting harm matter ethically and
carry roughly equal weight. In a postcon-
ception case of an already existing individ-
ual, the harm is person-affecting; in a
different-individual case, the harm is the
non-person-affecting fact of creating a
world with more harm than might have
existed in an alternative world. From this
picture, DeGrazia concludes that when
parents can choose whether to have a
child with a signiﬁcant disability or a dif-
ferent child without that disability, or
when parents can choose whether to have
a child in signiﬁcantly disadvantaging life
circumstances or to have a different child
in different life circumstances (geograph-
ically, temporally or even with a different
partner), procreation is wrong if one
could reasonably have been expected to
act so as to make the world a better place.
For disability rights advocates, this con-
clusion is profoundly disturbing. It
assumes that a world is a better place if it
lacks an individual with a signiﬁcant dis-
ability and instead contains a different
individual. But why should this be so if
the individuals in question have the same
moral status and each leads a life that in
individual-affecting terms is not harmful?
The answer can only be a comparison
among lives in objective terms: that the
presence of a non-disabled life is object-
ively better than the presence of a dis-
abled life worth living.
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